Firm 1 's best response is shown in Figure 3 . The straight line ZZ is the locus of points for which firm 1 and firm 2's outputs add up to exactly the limit output. Points below ZZ represent combinations of xi and x2 that allow entry, while points above this line denote individual outputs that deter entry.
For low values of x2 firm 1 chooses the quantity rf(x2) that maximizes its profit from allowing entry, that is, entry is allowed. This is true for all x2 less than x2(Z). At x2 = x2(Z), firm 1 's best response jumps up to make up the difference between the limit output and firm 2's quantity, that is, entry is 12 We define xf2 (Z) to be zero if the intersection occurs at negative x2. (i) When Z < xu, each incumbent produces xNE and the entrant stays out in equilibrium. Entry is blockaded by the oligopoly. The equilibrium is unique and symmetric.
(ii) When xu < Z < Z, any incumbent outputs in the set D = {(xi, x2) 6 R2+: xx + x2 = Z, x2(Z) < X/ < Z ? x^(Z), /, j = 1, 2; / ^ j}9 and the entrant staying out is an equilibrium. The oligopoly prevents entry by producing exactly Z.
13
The interested reader should refer to the Appendix for the technical details. (iv) When Z> Z, the unique equilibrium has each incumbent producing Xe and the entrant entering the industry with an output of x^x^, Xe).
Case i of Proposition 1 tells us that when the limit output is very small, each incumbent ignores the threat of entry and the unconstrained equilibrium aggregate output automatically blockades entry.
However, for larger limit outputs we get the entry deterring regime of case ii where the incumbents produce exactly the limit output in equilibrium. As the limit output increases further, both entry allowing and entry deterring equilibria are possible (case iii), while for even greater levels of limit output (case iv), the unique equilibrium is to allow entry. The reasoning is similar to that given above for the nonexistence of type 2 free riding in the G&V model. This is formally stated in Proposition 3 below.
Proposition 3. Let Z < Z < Z, so that both entry allowing and entry deterring equilibria exist.
Then, V /, j = 1, 2; / ^ j\ a necessary condition for coordination failure underinvestment is that an incumbent's maximum profit from deterring entry UfE*(Xj) be increasing in the other's output at the point where it is indifferent between allowing entry and deterring entry. 
Proof. Suppose Z < Z < Z but xfax < x2(Z). From Proposition l(iii)
,
Other Examples of Coordination Failure Underinvestment
This section briefly discusses two other models that exhibit coordination failure underinvest ment. Our purpose is to show that this type of underinvestment can be prevalent in a variety of models with precommitment equilibria and should, hence, be studied in greater depth. 
